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POVERTY LAW AND POOR PEOPLE: THE PLACE
OF GENDER AND CLASS IN CLINIC PRACTICE
SHELLEY GAVIGAN
RESUME
L'auteur r6examine dans cet article les pr6misses th~oriques du droit de la
pauvret6 et la contribution de l'analyse fdministe dans ce domaine. Elle soutient
que toute pratique juridique, y compris la pratique en clinique, repose sur un
fondement th6orique et ensuite que le cadre th6orique qu'une personne s'est
donn6 faqonne sa pratique et le lien qu'elle entretient avec la loi. Elle amorce
son article en traitant de la signification de l'acc~s A la justice et de la place de
l'organisation dans le droit de la pauvret6. Elle conclut en consid6rant les
rdpercussions d'une reconceptualisation de la place de l'appartenance sexuelle
et de classe dans la pratique du droit de la pauvret6.
1. INTRODUCTION
Anyone who has worked in a legal clinic can empathize with the wit and
sentiment expressed by the Far Side cartoonist Gary Larsen in his "Crisis Clinic"
cartoon: a decrepid building listing in wildly rough waters on the verge of
proceeding headlong over a waterfall. Crisis management and the management
of crises seem to define legal clinic work. To be sure a crisis is never far from
the experience of those who turn to the clinics for assistance and those whose
work is the practice of poverty law. No crisis ever seems more pressing or
difficult than the present, and this present offers no exception.
During a year I spent supervising law students at Parkdale Community Legal
Services in the early 1980s, I often felt like a person with a bit part in the film,
and later television series, "MASH." With each crackle of the intercom I
imagined that our receptionist, the indefatigable Dorothy Leatch, would next
say, "The choppers are here, They are bringing in the wounded." Those of us
Copyright © 1995. Shelley Gavigan. Shelley Gavigan is Associate Professor at Osgoode
Hall Law School, York University. Ms. Gavigan is also the Academic Director of Parkdale
Community Legal Services. The ideas expressed here are the author's and may not reflect the
views of the staff and board of Parkdale Community Legal Services. The author would like
to thank Deanna Jubas for her technical assistance, Karen Andrews for her comments, and
students and staff of Parkdale Community Legal Services for their many challenges.
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who are committed to poverty law and clinic practice now know for certain that
the choppers are here, neo conservative hatchet men who are forcing a dramatic
and unprecedented restructuring of the foundation of Canadian social, economic
and political life, and, as long as our doors are able to stay open, and our clinics
staffed, we will have the dubious honour of witnessing first hand their casualties.
We attest that the war on poverty (really never more than a skirmish) which
facilitated the emergence of store front law offices and community based law,1
has given way to the war on the poor.2
The metaphor of war informs us: our caseworkers are frontline, our work in the
trenches, our clients "battered but not beaten," 3 and we, like our clients and the
communities we serve, feel under siege.
Now that the principle of universality in Canada's social programmes has been
jettisoned, surviving social programmes ostensibly designed to serve the partic-
ular needs of the poor are in their sight lines. The cuts to social assistance rates
in Ontario effective October 1, 1995 place the household income for welfare
recipients beneath even the insult of a 'poverty line' suggested by the Fraser
Institute. 4
In this article, then, I hope to illustrate that all legal practice, including clinic
practice, has a theoretical foundation and I hope further to illustrate that one's
theoretical framework, whether articulated or not, inevitably shapes one's
practice and engagement with law. In other words, the issue is not theory versus
practice, but rather "What Theory and What Practice?" In my view, the interrogation
of this rather large question is best done through a series of smaller, though no less
significant, questions, some of which I will attempt to answer here.
1. See J. Abell, "Ideology and the Emergence of Legal Aid in Saskatchewan" (1993) 15
Dalhousie Law Journal 295 at 142-146.
2. See M. B. Katz, The Undeserving Poor: From the War on Poverty to the War on Wel-
fare (New York: Pantheon, 1989).
3. To quote the title of L. MacLeod's Report for the Canadian Advisory Council on the
Status of Women, "Battered but Not Beaten: Preventing Wife Battering in Canada"
(Ottawa: CASWC, 1987).
4. The Fraser Institute's 1994 poverty line for a single person in Ontario is $7,556 per
annum, for a household of 4 persons, $17,542. Prior to the 22% cut to Ontario social as-
sistance payments, a single employable person was entitled to receive $8,395 per
annum, a heterosexual couple with two children, $22,010. Both these amounts are thou-
sands of dollars beneath either the Statistics Canada Low Income Cut-Offs for 1994
($16,609 and $31,256 respectively) or the Canadian Council on Social Development
Income Lines ($13,770 and $32,130 respectively): see D. P. Ross, E. R. Shillington and
C. Lochhead, The Canadian Fact Book on Poverty-1994 (Ottawa: Canadian Council on
Social Development, 1994) at 14-16, 21-24.
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a. Whose face(s) do we see when we meet the poor? Do we need to
understand why they are poor?
b. How should legal services be defined and how should these legal services
be delivered? Does access to justice mean more than one thing?
c. Can the interests of the poor be advanced through the law, or is the law
only a site of defensive struggle?
d. Is the role of the poverty law lawyer to 'stop' poverty? If so, what sort of
advocacy should a poverty lawyer do?
e. How are cases selected and by what process? Should poverty lawyers develop
case selection criteria that enhance access for certain kinds of poor clients and
their cases, while limiting access in others? What process should be developed
for review of such decisions? What is the role of the community?
f. What are the implications of the Rules of Professional Conduct in all of this?
I do not claim to be the first to visit these questions, nor will I be the last. Neither
will I claim to offer definitive answers.
In the midst of this yet most serious crisis faced in recent years by poor people
in Ontario, and their legal advocates, my call for a revisiting of the theoretical
premises of poverty law and for a rethinking of the contribution of feminist
analysis to this area may seem ill-timed. I offer no apology. A commitment to
principle and analysis is not something one can afford only when times are good,
or at least not so bleak. A true testing ground of one's principles is not good
times, but hard times. And to be sure, these hard times will test poverty law
advocates to their limits.
2. WHO ARE THE POOR? WHEN WE MEET THE POOR,
WHOSE FACES Do WE SEE?
The poor are not a generic gender-neutral category of unfortunate souls. While
the majority of low-income families in Canada are headed by men,5 women are
more likely to experience the social and economic deprivation of poverty. In
particular, women who are single mothers with children under eighteen experi-
ence poverty rates which are disproportionate to their representation in the total
population and the ranks of the poor.6 As Diana Pearce has observed with respect
5. See K Battle, "Poverty: Myths, Misconceptions and Half-Tniths," in Social Welfare Policy
in Canada, ed. XX (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1993) 148 at 151 and 160.
6. Ibid. at 151. In 1976, the National Council of Welfare reported that 85.5 per cent of sin-
gle parent families were headed by women and that 66 per cent of female single parents
lived below the poverty line: One in a world of twos: A report by NCW on one-parent
families (Ottawa: National Council of Welfare, 1976). In 1987, husband-wife families
(1995) 11 Journal of Law and Social Policy
to similar American figures, "[i]t is not the lack of two adults [in a household]
that is associated with higher rates of poverty, but the fact that it is a woman
alone, struggling to maintain a household on her own, that is so highly correlated
with poverty." 7
This observation of the extent of women's poverty is not new, the phenomenon
of women's poverty is not a recent development.8 Indeed, as Veronica Strong-
Boag has illustrated in her historical work on mothers' allowances, sole support
mothers have been "long identified as prime victims of poverty." 9 The official
explanations offered for women's poverty, and concomitant legislative provis-
ions have tended to assume, and inevitably have reinforced, women's marginal
participation in the paid labour market and primary responsibility in the home.
In other words, women's poverty was understood to be a private, familial
problem, caused by the death or desertion of the primary male breadwinner. And,
if a woman on mothers' allowance worked at all, she should arrange "to earn
without leaving the home, as by keeping roomers, dressmaking or doing laundry
work in the home." 10 Women's poverty was visible; women's work invisible.
This tension has a contemporary resonance.11 The current Minister of Commu-
nity and Social Services in Ontario has suggested that women who work and
who are unable to find a child care space should do what was done in the 1950s,
a neighbour or relative should be asked to babysit. But, as others have noted,
with one earner had an average income of $34,900; families with female heads had an
average income of $18,000. Based on Statistics Canada's Low Income Cut-Offs in
1982, 55 per cent of families headed by women were below the official poverty line, as
compared with 11 per cent for all families: Statistics Canada, Women in Canada: a sta-
tistical report (2nd ed.) (Ottawa: Supply & Services, 1990) at 11. In 1993, the National
Council of Welfare's Poverty Profile Update for 1991 reported at 8, Graph B, that the
poverty rate for single mother families in Canada was 57.7% in 1980, 60.6% in 1990
and 61.9% in 1991. See also Women and Poverty in Canada Revisited (Ottawa: Health
& Welfare, 1991).
7. "Welfare is not for women: toward a model of advocacy to meet the needs of women in
poverty" (1985) 19 Clearinghouse Rev. 412 at 412.
8. See M. Little, "Manhunts and Bingo Blabs: The Moral Regulation of Ontario Single
Mothers," (1994) 19 Can. J. Soc. 233. For a detailed and critical history of the experi-
ence of single mothers in the United States, see L. Gordon, Pitied But Not Entitled: Sin-
gle Mothers, and the History of Welfare (New York: The Free Press, 1994).
9. (V. Strong-Boag, 1986: 91)
10. Ibid. at 96.
11. Perhaps the early advocates of mothers' allowance would champion the current shift in the
garment industry to homework in the site of production-but as did the earliest social poli-
cies designed to ameliorate women's poverty. This communion of home and workplace for
women of course means that for these women, there is no respite from work.
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the Canadian labour market is a changed and changing site. In 1988, the Report
of the Social Assistance Review Committee, 12 observed:
The world of work has not kept pace with the tremendous changes in the
composition and nature of families, particularly the changing participation
of family members in the labour force. The most obvious and profound
change has been in the role of women. 13
More recently, The Canadian National Child Care Study: Parental Work Pat-
terns and Child Care Needs confirmed that in 1990 most women (58.5%), even
those with young children, were in the labour force or actively looking for
work. 14 The Child Care Study also found that the majority of families with
preschool-age children were dual-earner families: "established images of family
life no longer matching reality." 15 The Transitions Report estimated that by the
year 2000 there will be equal numbers of men and women in the labour force. 16
Although official figures indicate that women's households are heavily reliant
upon government assistance as the source of income (and indeed more so than
male-headed households),17 in fact a majority of female-headed households (66
per cent) are dependent upon earnings as their source of income.1 8 The Transi-
tions Report found that
...even with the many hardships poor women face-including delinquent child
support payments, lesser access to contributory pensions, lack of affordable child
care, and limited job prospects-only a third of the province's female-headed
families require [or perhaps more accurately, receive] social assistance. 19
As Parkdale Community Legal Services observed in its submission concerning
employment standards legislation in Ontario, women's labour force participa-
tion has more than doubled since the Second World War, women now make up
42.6% of the Canadian labour force.20
12. Ontario, Report of the Social Assistance Review Committee: Transitions (Toronto:
Queen's Printer, 13 May (1988) at 27 (Chair: G. Thomson) [hereafter Transitions].
13. Ibid. at 92.
14. Ottawa, Statistics Canada, (1992) at 23.
15. Ibid. at 17.
16. Supra, note 19 at 92.
17. Statistics Canada, Women in Canada, supra, note 6 at 106.
18. Ibid.
19. Supra, note 12 at 30.
20. Brief in Response to the "Draft Discussion Paper on Changes to the Employment Stan-
dards Act by the Ontario Advisory Council on Women's Issues." Submitted by
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Despite this, the clinic observed that women are still overwhelmingly segregated
into specific industries and jobs noted for "low pay, little status and minimal
prospects for advancement". 21 And, as Judy Fudge has written, "The feminiza-
tion of the labour force [has been] matched by a complementary feminization
of the labour market, the increase in jobs typically associated with women, jobs
that are part-time, temporary, poorly paid and insecure."' 22 "And, despite their
increasing participation in the labour force, in general women continue to bear
a greater burden than men do with respect to household labour and the care-giv-
ing for children and the elderly."23 Immigrant women are significantly over-rep-
resented in "low-skill, low-wage jobs," such as those in the textile industries,
traditionally a female job ghetto, but more significantly than that in the current
Canadian context, 36% of all workers in the textile and garment industries are
immigrant women. 24 Newly arrived immigrant women tend to be employed (in
larger numbers than Canadian-born women) in the textile industries at jobs
characterized by low wages, piece work, homework and virtually unregulated
working conditions. 25
This suggests that a gendered division of wage labour and lower income for
women in the labour force are directly and significantly implicated in women's
poverty. Coupled with predominant responsibility for child care and child
rearing, it is clear that the face of the poor in Canada is a female face, a single
mother living on sub poverty line income derived either from social assistance
or low wages.
Parkdale Community Legal Services, Law Union of Ontario, Employment Standards
Work Group and Ontario Nurses Association Staff Union (April, 1989).
21. Ibid.
22. "Reconceiving Employment Standards Legislation: Labour Law's Little Sister and the
Feminization of Labour" (1991) 7 J. Law & Social Pol'y 73 at 77.
23. Supra note 20 at 2.
24. Canadian Advisory Council on the Status of Women, Immigrant Women in Canada: A
Policy Perspective (Background Paper 1988 at 1E) by S.B. Seward & K. McDade (Ot-
tawa: CASWC,1988); R. Ng, "Racism, Sexism and Immigrant Women," in Changing
Patterns: Women in Canada (2nd ed.) S. Burt, L. Code & L. Domey, (Toronto:
McClelland & Stewart, 1993) at 279.
25. See Seward and McDade, ibid. at 14-18; R. Ng, "Immigrant Women in Canada: A So-
cially Constructed Category" (1986) 15 Resources for Feminist Research 13; R. Ng,
ibid.; on the unregulated state of working conditions, notwithstanding the existence of
provincial employment standards legislation, see Fudge, supra, note 22 at 84.
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2.1 Class Tells for Women Too: The Importance of a Feminist
Theoretical Framework
Some feminists argue that the family household, with its overarching familial
ideology,26 along with a system of wage labour divided largely along gender
lines, are the primary sites of women's oppression in western capitalist socie-
ties. 27 In fact, it is clear that the two "sites" are inextricably intertwined, as
women's familial responsibilities are used as a rationale for their lower wages,
on the clearly ideological premise that their earnings are secondary and supple-
mentary to the main, breadwinning income of a male wage earner. In my view, this
all suggests that the image of poverty is phenomenal in the marxist sense, requiring
that one investigate further beyond its outward appearance to uncover its underlying
essence. If one is prepared to undertake such an investigation it quickly becomes
clear, in my view, that one must be prepared to use concepts that are more analytic
and specific. That this is imperative is becoming ever more apparent given the clear
correlation between unemployment and recourse to welfare assistance.28
It is my view that the concern with the definition, extent and measurement of poverty
is a concern directed at outward phenomena only. Although it is important to
describe the economic facts of poverty, regardless of which is the best measure, the
analysis of the statistics and their implication cannot rest with terms which speak
of "poor families" or even "single parent families". Even the terms "female-
headed" and "male-headed" households imply that these households are essen-
tially the same phenomena, or at least two sides of the same "household" coin.
The poverty which can be identified, described by some as the "feminization of
poverty", 29 derives from underlying inequality. But what is expressed by the
notion of the feminization of poverty? Is the poverty of single mothers caused
26. 1 draw here on my earlier work, see S. Gavigan "Paradise Lost, Paradox Revisited: The
Implications of Familial Ideology for Feminist, Lesbian and Gay Engagement to Law"
(1993) 31 Osgoode Hall LJ 589.
27. See also, M. McIntosh, 'The state and the oppression of women," in A. Kuhn & A. M.
Wolpe, Feminism and materialism: women and modes of production (London: Routledge
& Kegan Paul, 1978) at 254; M. Barrett & M. McIntosh, The anti-social family (London:
Verso & NLB, 1982); P. Armstrong & H. Armstrong, The double ghetto 2d ed. (Toronto,
1984); D. A. Chekki & J. R. Hofley, 'Women and inequality: some indicators of change,"
in J. Harp & J. R. Hofley, Structured inequality in Canada (Scarborough: Prentice-Hall,
1980) at 378; Pearce, Welfare is not for women, supra, note 7.
28. The Social Planning Council of Metropolitan Toronto reported that as of March 1985,
52.7 per cent of the General Welfare Assistance cases in Ontario were in receipt of as-
sistance due to unemployment up from 41 per cent in 1979: see Living on the margin:
welfare reform for the next decade (Toronto: Social Planning Council of Metropolitan
Toronto, 1986) at 16.
29. Pearce, supra, note 7.
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by marriage breakdown and inadequate, intermittent and unpaid support, 30 or
to use the evocative phrase currently favoured by politicians, 'deadbeat dads'? 31
Or is the poverty of women and children within marriage and the family "most
clearly exposed at marriage breakdown or divorce,"' 32 because, "...it is at this
point that the economic vulnerability of women caused by marriage and the
sexual division of labour is most clearly exposed."'33
The way in which one conceptualizes the nature of the inequality of poor women is
important. It is simultaneously class and gender based, in Canada race and ethnicity
are undoubtedly implicated as well. We need to recast "poverty" issues along lines
which are attentive to gender, class, race and ethnicity. If we stop relying upon moral
criteria and begin to sharpen our analysis, it will become ever more clear that gender
and class relations and engagement with feminist and working class problematics and
politics are a prerequisite for those of us in poverty law practices.
3. WHAT ARE LEGAL SERVICES FOR THE POOR?
No one who witnessed the legal aid funding crisis in Ontario during the early fall
of 1995 in Ontario can doubt that the judicare side of the Ontario legal aid plan was
under serious attack. 34 While the judicare plan in Ontario has received a reprieve,
few people in the Clinics are disposed to the fantasy that the worst is behind us.
Legal Services for the poor, Legal Aid and Poverty Law are often used interchange-
ably. To a great many lawyers and legal aid administrators, legal services for the poor
means criminal defence work, criminal legal aid. In my own experience as a lawyer
in Saskatchewan in the 1970s, it also meant criminal defence work, but as a clinic
lawyer in a publicly funded, community based legal services clinic.35 But, as the
National Council of Welfare has argued recently, legal aid programmes in Canada
which emphasize criminal legal aid do not address the legal needs of most poor
people, 36 and not incidentally, poor women. 37
30. As suggested by the federal human resources minister L. Axworthy in Improving Social
Security in Canada: A Discussion Paper (September 8, 1994) at 20-21.
31. find A. Rock's quotation in The Lawyers Weekly, September 22.
32. C. Smart, The Ties That Bind (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1984) at xiii.
33. Ibid. at xiii.
34. See C. Schmitz, "Veteran criminal lawyer disbands firm; accuses Ontario government
of 'fraud"', The Lawyers' Weekly vol. 15 no. 19 (22 September 1995) 1; J. Furlong &
C. Schmitz, "Lawyers Fear Legal Aid Crisis could Wipe Them Out," ibid. p. 2.
35. For a critical history of the Saskatchewan legal assistance clinics, Abell, supra note 1.
36. Ottawa, Minister of Supply & Services, "Legal Aid and the Poor: A Report by the Na-
tional Council of Welfare" by National Council of Welfare (1995) at 9-10:
37. Ibid. at 12. See also, "Equal Justice for Women and Children: A Report" Ontario Fam-
Poverty Law and Poor People
Why? Because judicare legal aid emphasizes access to private lawyers and the
courts. In the Canadian context, legal aid, especially criminal legal aid, has
tended to be driven by either the legal profession's vision of how legal services
are to be delivered (that is on a fee for service basis by private lawyers) or
cost-effective notions (that is, salaried lawyers in staff delivery models, such as
duty counsel). The image of the poor in 'legal aid' programmes is a blurred
imprecise one. Poverty law, as discussed below, needs to be understood as
related to but not collapsible under the heading of legal aid.
Unlike corporate, real estate or tax law, the area of poverty law is neither
presented nor understood as a discrete legal category. One might be forgiven for
assuming that poverty law implies something other than real estate or corporate
law; however, it can be argued with equal force that tax and corporate law are
all implicated in poverty.
When Stephen Wexler wrote his pioneering "Practicing Law for Poor People ' 38
twenty-five years ago, he took the position that lawyers for the poor need to take
the reality of the lives and struggles of 'the poor' and not the law as our starting
point. However, as I hope to illustrate, this is something which is easily asserted,
and less easily comprehended.
The problem is at least twofold: first, poverty and by extension poverty law
varies according to context. In the province of Ontario, the definition of poverty
law depends upon the position of the person asked. To a lawyer in a corporate
law practice, it most assuredly means that poverty law is work that other lawyers
do. At community legal clinics in Ontario, it means social assistance, unemploy-
ment insurance, income security and disability issues, landlord and tenant law
and mental health. In Toronto clinics, it has long meant immigration and refugee
law. Clinic work also encompasses the rights and issues of injured, unorganized and
unemployed workers, the homeless and children, youth and the elderly. It has come
to mean AIDS/HIV advocacy, 39 and environmental law, and clinics for specific
ily Law Tariff Sub-Committee to the Legal Aid Committee of the Law Society of
Upper Canada, (May 1992). This sub-committee found a "marked gender difference in
the populations served by the two existing tariffs" [for family and criminal legal aid
certificates in the 1991-92 fiscal year]: 80% of certificates issued in criminal legal aid
matters were issued to men; 70% of certificates issued in family legal aid matters were
issued to women. Criminal legal aid certificates accounted for just over 50% of all cer-
tificates issued; family law certificates accounted for 24% (the remaining certificates in
1991-92 were issued for immigration/refugee certificates (15%) and other civil matters
(9%). See also M. J. Mossman, "Gender Equality and Legal Aid Services: A Research
Agenda for Institutional Change" (1993) 15 Sydney Law Rev. 30.
38. (1970) 79 Yale Law Journal 1005.
39. D. Herman, "Aids as a Poverty Law Issue" [unpublished paper] submitted in partial ful-
filment of the requirements of the Intensive Programme in Poverty Law at Parkdale
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communities such as, the African Canadian Legal Services, Aboriginal Legal
Services, and Chinese and South-East Asian Legal Services for Metropolitan
Toronto.
Whatever the breadth of "poverty law" and the elasticity of its scope, I do
want to hold onto a conceptual distinction between poverty law and the
judicare face of legal aid. Poverty law is poor people's law. Form and content
aside, this means that the pivotal defining criterion is financial or economic.
The difficulty in this, Richard Abel once argued, is that "[t]he category of
beneficiaries defined by economic indices has no organic coherence, no
necessary unity."40 Whilst acknowledging that there are many different per-
spectives on the meaning of poverty and many measures thereof,4 1 it is my
view, as I have argued above, that economic indices, if probed and recast, reveal
a coherence not often enough acknowledged.
4. POVERTY LAW: WHAT IS TO BE DONE? CAN THE INTERESTS OF
THE POOR BE ADVANCED THROUGH THE LAW, OR IS THE LAW
A SITE OF DEFENSIVE STRUGGLE ONLY FOR THE POOR?
4.1 Formal equality or substantive equality - community clinics
... the clinics are in a position to take the law to those who need it most. It
is almost trite to point out that a great many poor people have never been
made aware of the right they enjoy under our laws... The clinics, located in,
Community Legal Services (Winter Term, 1988); P. Shime, "Aids and Poverty Law:
Inaction, Indifference, and Ignorance," (1994) 10 J.L. & Social Pol'y 155.
40. "Law without politics: Legal aid under advanced capitalism" (1985) 32 UCLA Law
Rev. 474 at 495.
41. See Ottawa, Canadian Council on Social Development National Task Force on the Def-
inition and Measurement of Poverty in Canada, "Not enough: the meaning and mea-
surement of poverty in Canada" (1984). In the CCSD Task Force's view, the closest
one comes to an "official" definition of poverty in Canada is that developed by Statis-
tics Canada: a family household which spends more than 58.5 per cent of its income on
the basic necessities of food, clothing and shelter is said to live below the "low-income
cut-off." The CCSD's own "poverty line" is calculated at 50 per cent of the average in-
come figure. The CCSD Task Force also referred to the "implied poverty lines" of pro-
vincial welfare administrations and that of the Social Planning Council of Metropolitan
Toronto. The various 1994 poverty lines for a household of four were:
Social Assistance $ 22,010
Social Planning Council of Metro Toronto $40,560
CCSD $32,130
StatsCan Low-Income Cut-Offs
(large urban setting) $ 31,356
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and run by local communities, can reach out to advise people of their rights.
They take the law to the people... In doing all of this, the clinics help con-
vince the poor that they have a stake in this society.42
... I think there are a number of lessons which can be learned from the com-
munity legal aid clinics. ... I am satisfied that the clinics have become an
important and integral part of legal aid... I am open to suggestions that the
role of the clinics be increased and enhanced. Clinics take the law directly
to the people. They involve the community in setting service priorities.
They ensure that problems are handled by persons with expertise in the sub-
ject matter... They promote self-help, and they work actively in public legal
education.43
The discussion in the previous section raises an equally important question: what
is or ought to be the objective of "poverty law" theory and practice? On the one
hand, poverty law advocates have been identified with the "access to justice"
movement endorsed by the two Attorneys-General quoted above. At the same
time, there has been a longstanding open critique of the legal system and
lawyers, coupled with a stated commitment to eliminate, or at least alleviate
poverty. The extent to which the law is implicated in poverty and the extent to
which lawyers and the legal system ought to be involved and relied upon is rather
contested. Richard Abel has argued with some force that there is a dearth of
unity of objectives in the access to justice movement and no clear sense of what
"justice" is sought, some argue for creative use of law and the creation of new
(legal) rights whereas others express a commitment to "substantive justice"
rather than formal or procedural justice. 44
It has long been an axiomatic theme in the "law and poverty" literature that
access to justice must mean more than access to lawyers and courts. 45 Richard
Abel has argued that concern with formal justice and redistribution of lawyers'
services reflect lawyers' perspective, one internal to the legal system. It is his
position that formal justice cannot be used as a vehicle for achieving social
42. The Honourable R. R. McMurtry, Q.C., Attorney-General for Ontario (as he then was),
"Notes for a statement to the Ontario Legislature Standing Committee on the Adminis-
tration of Justice," (December 1 1982) at 30-31, quoted by M. J. Mossman, "Commu-
nity legal clinics in Ontario" (1983) 3 Windsor Yearbook. Access to Justice 375 at 376.
43. The Honourable I. Scott, Q.C., Attorney-General for Ontario, "Legal Aid Statement,"
(August 17 1985) at 11-12.
44. Abel, "Law without politics" supra, note 39 at 491.
45. See Wexler, supra, note 37. R.J. Gathercole, "Legal services and the poor," in R. G. Evans
& M. J. Trebilcock, Lawyers and the consumer interest: regulating the market for legal ser-
vices (Toronto: Butterworths, 1982) at 407; R. Abel, "Socializing the legal profession: can
redistributing lawyers' services achieve social justice?" (1979) 1 Law & Policy Q.5.
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justice in a capitalist society, indeed, he is convinced that the ideal of formal
justice is unrealizable within capitalism, "Social justice is thus a prerequisite for
formal justice." 46 Abel usefully examined the implications of various ways in
which lawyers' services might be redistributed (including deprofessionalization
and informalism) to illustrate that without a fundamental restructuring of social
and economic relations the impact of access or lack thereof is at best marginal.
His work is particularly relevant for those engaged in poverty law because he
is able to illustrate graphically the limitations of one approach encouraged in
the poverty law literature, client "self-help". 47 Although the encouragement of
"self-help" is framed as part of a commitment to empowering the previously
powerless, and in reaction against dependency upon experts and routine re-
course to formality, Abel suggests that the result is the withdrawal of lawyers
from people who in any event have had limited access to the profession, ". ..it
may be impossible to restore to individuals the capacity to engage in self-help
as long as they are opposed by adversaries who continue to employ legal
representation. '48 Thus this form of "empowerment" may be mythical at best
and coercive at worst.
As trenchant as Abel's critique of the self-help or deprofessionalization move-
ment is, he nevertheless evinced an ambivalence as to whether the law was an
appropriate or important site for struggle,49 an ambivalence which in my view
derives from the contradictory nature of law within capitalism. For although he
insists that formal justice cannot precede social justice, still he argues that:
... the only source of power for the poor and disadvantaged [in American
society] is those rights derived from written law. The invocation of those
rights is always a symbolic act, and the symbolic is always formal. 50
This is somewhat reminiscent of if perhaps more tentative than E.P. Thompson's
historic defence of the rule of law ("The law may be rhetoric but it need not be
empty rhetoric."' 5 1) at the close of Whigs and Hunters. Thompson insisted that
the equity and universality claimed by the rule of law in capitalist society is
more than sham:
46. Abel, ibid. 7.
47. See Wexler, supra, note 37.
48. Abel, supra, note 44 at 10-11.
49. See also his "Informalism: a tactical equivalent to law?" (1985) 19 Clearinghouse Rev. at 374.
50. Ibid. 382.
51. E.P. Thompson, Whigs and hunters: the origins of the Black Act (Middlesex: Penguin,
1975) at 263.
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It is true that in history the law can be seen to mediate and to legitimize ex-
istent class relations. Its forms and procedures may crystallize those rela-
tions and mask ulterior injustice. But this mediation, through the forms of
law, is something quite distinct from the exercise of unmeditated force. The
forms and rhetoric of law acquire a distinct identity which may, on occa-
sion, inhibit power and afford some protection to the powerless.
5 2
If one accepts Thompson's position as theoretically sound, the question which
still remains is whether the rule of the law is the only form through which the
powerful may be inhibited. And here, the experience of poverty law practice
surely can be invoked. For while it may be that the legal form may on occasion
be used to press a claim or defend oneself, still it is also crystal clear that one
cannot confine oneself to legal fora. As Bob Fine has argued, in a friendly
critique of Thompson,
It is clear that the "rule of law" does impose effective inhibitions on power.
What remains at issue, however, is what kind of inhibitions, what are its
limits, what is its base? ... What must be resolved is the relation between in-
hibitions enforced by the form of law and by forms of extra-legal political
organization. 53
5. ORGANIZING: IS THE ROLE OF THE POVERTY TO STOP
POVERTY? WHAT SORT OF ADVOCACY SHOULD A POVERTY
LAWYER DO?
In this section I wish to take up the important question of "extra-legal political
organization" by focusing upon and re-examining the pioneering work of
Stephen Wexler.54 Although based upon American experience and published
twenty-five years ago in an American legal journal, Wexler's explicit critique
of traditional lawyering and attendant implicit critique of legal education is still
relevant today. Writing in 1970, on the first wave of the "new left bar", Wexler
sought to expose the narrowness of both traditional lawyering (the solving of
legal problems and the one-to-one solicitor client relationship) and the self-in-
terest of the legal profession, including poverty law oriented young lawyers. For
Wexler, the legal problems experienced by the poor are "the product of poverty
and are common to all poor people."'55 Poverty then, the cause of the problems,
and not the law, must be tackled and stopped. Lest poverty lawyers find the
52. Ibid. 266.
53. "Law and class", in B. Fine, J. Young Capitalism and the rule of law (London: Hutch-
inson, 1979) 29 at 30.
54. Supra, note 37.
55. Ibid. 1009.
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prospect of attempting to eliminate poverty a daunting one, Wexler insisted that
lawyers abandon the notion of heroic white knighthood:
Poverty will not be stopped by people who are not poor. If poverty is
stopped, it will be stopped by poor people. And poor people can stop pov-
erty only if they work at it together. The lawyer who wants to serve poor
people must put his [sic] skills to the task of helping poor people organize
themselves.... Specifically, the lawyer must seek to strengthen existing or-
ganizations of poor people, and to help poor people start organizations
where none exist.56
Wexler outlined the tasks for poverty lawyers as primarily work in the nature of
information, education and training lay advocates, it is clear that he placed direct
resort to law very low on his agenda. Again, this is consistent with the theme in
poverty law, that legal victories do not amount to real victories, and that legal
change does not amount to social change. 57 He was concerned to avoid creating
"new dependencies" for the apparently already too dependent poor. The under-
lying question seems to be one of who really instructs whom. Related to this is
a concern that poor people will look to lawyers for the solutions to all their
problems (Is there historical evidence to warrant this concern?). In my view, this
perception of the nature of the relationship between lawyers and their poor
clients indicates that Wexler feared that lawyers for the poor could easily become
agents of social control of the poor. This notion of lawyers as agents of social
control is not peculiar to Wexler,5 8 but it does rather fly in the face of the
professional ideology of lawyer as advocate for rather than controller of the
client who retains the lawyer's services. The adequacy of this formulation needs
to be interrogated, because one wonders whether it is appropriate to think of all
lawyers as agents of social control, or whether only certain kinds of lawyers
dealing with certain kinds of clients would fall within this category. Does
Conrad Black's lawyer control him? Does it perhaps depend upon who possesses
the greater economic power in the relationship?
56. Ibid. 1009-1010.
57. See Gathercole, supra, note 44, discussion of the successful advocacy and litigation
waged by Parkdale Community Legal Services on behalf of tenants in the mid-1970s,
and the remaining untouched issue of adequacy of the accommodation of the rental
premises which were the subject matter of the litigation.
58. See, N. Christie, "Conflicts as property", in C. E. Reasons & R. M. Rich, The sociology
of law: a conflict perspective (Toronto: Butterworths, 1978); R. Ericson & P. M.
Baranek, The ordering of justice (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1982). Cf.
Maureen Cain, "The general practice lawyer and the client: towards a radical concep-
tion" (1979) 7 Int. J. Soc. Law 331.
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It was, however, Wexler's call to organize that was both most challenging and
most problematic. His insistence that lawyers essentially take a back seat in the
poor people's organization is as critically important today as when he wrote it.
It is troubling enough that lawyers and legal academics are disposed to the
conceit that they hold the monopoly on knowledge about law. But, lawyers
display a propensity to see themselves as experts on the world in general, and
all aspects of human affairs in particular. This, Wexler argued, imperils the
organizations with and in which lawyers are involved, "The lawyer must help
them do their thing, or get out."'59 And yet, in his effort to bring home the
importance of organizing, Wexler relied upon the following example, told to
him by a "very successful welfare rights organizer ' 60 to illustrate "the 'proper'
mentality for a poor people's lawyer:"'6 1
I found a recipient who worked hard at organizing, and was particularly
good in the initial stages of getting to talk to new people. I picked her up at
her apartment one morning to go out knocking on doors. While I was there,
I saw her child, and I noticed he seemed to be retarded. Because the boy
was too young for school and the family never saw a doctor, the mother had
never found out something was seriously wrong with her son. I didn't tell
her. If I had, she would have stopped working at welfare organizing to rush
around to look for help for son. I had some personal problems about doing
that, but I'm an organizer, not a social worker.62
Wexler conceded that this organizer has taken a very hard line and that the
retelling of this story invariably makes listeners recoil, however, it is his view
that the more that one can accept this organizer's model, "the more he [she] can
give poor people the wherewithal to change a world that hurts them."'63 This
model reflects more than a hard line. It reflects a dearth of analysis. It implies
that real organizing and real politics can only take place around issues "out
there"-somewhere else. Although perhaps written before the most recent
generation of feminists had begun to criticize the "public/private" split, the
organizer lacked both imagination and vision with respect to organizing issues.
From the brief example, it would appear that access to health care and child care
could easily have been taken up. Beyond that, the organizer's ridicule of a
woman who would "rush around looking for help for her son" most assuredly
59. Wexler, supra, note 37, 1021.
60. Ibid. 1010.
61. Ibid.
62. Ibid.
63. Ibid.
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implicates him (her?) as part of a world that hurts her and limits his (her?) ability
to assist in change.
In embracing this organizer's model, Wexler made the mistake of equating
individual legal right with individual human need. In his attempt to distance
himself from the individualization and isolation of social relations which may
result from invoking the law, the legal subject, and attendant individual legal
rights, he neglected the fact that human needs are both individual and social. To
sacrifice individual need without reflection and analysis is, in my view, to
imperil the success of a strategy for social change. 64
I challenge Wexler's example of an "organizer's dilemma" not to eschew the
place of organizing in poverty law, but rather to endorse it, to insist upon its
continuing relevance in the current context. However, as I hope to have demon-
strated in the earlier sections, an understanding of the face and place of the poor,
and a feminist analysis thereof, clarifies the strategic position of organizing in
poverty law. An analysis of the basis for the poverty of our clients, and an
understanding of the inter-relatedness of gender, class, race and ethnicity, must
inform both legal and organizing strategies designed to get at the root(s) of the
problem.65 One must understand why one is committed to organizing.
6. CASE SELECTION CRITERIA: SHOULD POVERTY LAW CLINICS
DEVELOP CASE SELECTION CRITERIA THAT ENHANCE ACCESS
TO CERTAIN KINDS OF POOR CLIENTS AND THEIR CASES,
WHILE LIMITING ACCESS IN OTHERS?
In this last section of the paper, I want to consider the implications of an
insistence upon the centrality of gender both in poverty and poverty law through
issue(s) relating to case selection criteria. Simply put, can clinics deliver
gendered services and in a poverty law context? If women are more at risk of
experiencing poverty than are men, should our clinics serve only women clients?
Ought we to restrict our services to addressing the needs of single mothers, who
64. For an excellent account of the relationship between the individual and the social con-
text, around the issue of abortion, see R. P. Petchesky, Abortion and woman's choice:
The state, sexuality and reproductive freedom (Boston: Northeastern University Press,
1985) at 1-18.
65. For an excellent illustration of feminist scholarship that has done this successfully in the
British context, see S. Cook & J. Watt, "Women, Racism and Poverty," in Women and
Poverty in Britain, C. Glendinning and J. Millar, (Brighton: Wheatsheaf Books, 19987)
at 53. Cook and Watt argue that "racism and sexism complicate women's relationship
to class and poverty" and illustrate with reference to black and Asian women's experi-
ence with social security, labour and immigration law how complex and contradictory
these inter-relations are.
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are employed in unorganized work places or who are on social assistance? If we
learn that access to child care is a central issue for working and unemployed
mothers, ought we to incorporate this issue into our practices, even if it does not
fit neatly into current legal categories or casework?
It is clear that many clinics have turned their minds to gender issues in a number
of important ways, hours of service and timing of mini-clinics are extended to
accommodate the needs of women with children. In many clinics, the request
by a woman client to be served by a female lawyer, community legal worker, or
student is accommodated. We are attentive to personal security issues when
attempting to telephone or correspond with women clients who are experiencing
or at risk of domestic violence. The contribution of these initiatives to enhancing
access to justice for poor women cannot be underestimated.
Some clinics have made domestic violence a part of the work of the clinic, and
indeed some student clinics associated with law schools have divisions or cells
that are called "Women's Divisions."' 66 There are compelling reasons for doing
this, but in my view, clinic case criteria or policies which characterize gender
issues as women's issues risk blurring the class and race dimensions of poor
women's life experiences. Poverty is not simply that part of financial eligibility
criteria that gets clients beyond the receptionist to see someone on intake. It is
not the fact of limited financial resources but the why of that we must keep in
our sights.
At the same time, rather than jettison the current areas of poverty law, I want to
argue for the reconceptualization of our understanding of "tenants," "workers,"
and "welfare recipients," "immigrants and refugees" and "sole support parents"
that challenges the implied gender and race neutrality of those clients. I am not
unmindful of the fact that, for instance, clinic welfare clients are primarily
women. This is not a coincidence, but nor is the explanation self-evident. If we
can move beyond the appeal of the obvious, we will be better positioned to focus
what is to be done. We will be better able to respond, for instance, to the
'deadbeat dads' sorts of government initiatives which consistently misrepresent
and reinforce in the public mind that single mothers are poor because of unpaid
child and spousal support 67 or because they are promiscuous. 68
66. For an account of the experience of one student clinic with a 'Women's Division cell'
and a new violence against women policy, see J. Abell, "Women, Violence and the
Criminal Law: It's the Fundamentals of Being a Lawyer that are at Stake Here," (1993)
17 Queen's L.J. 147.
67. Once again, this is the easiest and most often resorted to official explanation for the poverty
of women who are single mothers: see the Axworthy discussion paper, supra, note 30.
68. See Little, supra, note 8. This is why the spouse in the house issue never disappears
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Finally, there continues to be a host of professional and ethical challenges that
need to be addressed if we proceed to reconceptualize the work that we do. I
leave that important question to another day.
from the discussion of women's entitlement to welfare. I have argued elsewhere that the
experience of women on welfare illuminates so clearly that the various legislative defi-
nition of spouse are shaped and driven by class as much as gender and sexual orienta-
tion; see Gavigan, supra, note 26. The Conservative Ontario government is poised yet
again to breathe new breadth into the definition of 'spouse' in welfare law.
